Redesigning the South African Unemployment Insurance Fund : selected key policy and legal perspectives by Olivier, Marius et al.
396
REDESIGNING THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE FUND: 
SELECTED KEY POLICY AND LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES
Marius Olivier
BA LLB LLD
Director: International Institute for Social Law and Policy (IISLP);
Extraordinary Professor: Faculty of Law, Northwest University (Potchefstroom Campus);
Adjunct-Professor: Faculty of Law, University of Western Australia
Ockert Dupper 
BA LLB LLM SJD
Professor of Law, University of Stellenbosch
Avinash Govindjee
BA LLB LLM LLD
Associate Professor of Law, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University*
1  Introduction
This is the third in a series of three articles which address the key question 
as to how the Unemployment Insurance Fund (“UIF”) should be reformed 
in order to ensure an improved unemployment insurance mechanism, and 
to effect meaningful alignment with the other available social security 
interventions in South Africa. While the first contribution specifically 
addressed the existing gaps in coverage1 and the second addressed the 
concept of “activation” in the context of UIF reform,2 this contribution in the 
series examines selected issues from a policy and legal perspective. Against 
the background of the broader social security reform agenda in South Africa 
and the vision of a comprehensive social security system, the contribution 
covers five key areas, namely alignment with international standards; the 
need to develop synergies with the rest of the social security system and for 
institutional reform and alignment; addressing certain material deficiencies 
and inconsistencies in the UIF legislation (with reference to removing the 
restriction on certain contributors to benefit and redefining the range of 
dependants); re-aligning the current UIF benefit regime to focus on loss of 
*  This contribution is based on work emanating from a project completed by the authors for the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund of South Africa in relation to the reform of the South African 
unemployment insurance system  The authors wish to acknowledge the research assistance provided 
by Adriaan Wolvaardt, doctoral candidate and researcher of the International Institute for Social Law 
and Policy (“IISLP”), as well as the technical assistance of Jeanne van Zyl and Luyando Katiyatiya, 
both doctoral candidates at the University of Stellenbosch
1  O Dupper, MP Olivier & A Govindjee “Extending Coverage of the Unemployment Insurance-system in 
South Africa” (2010) 21 Stell LR 438
2 A Govindjee, M Olivier & O Dupper “Activation in the Context of the Unemployment Insurance System 
in South Africa” (2011) 22 Stell LR 205  
       
employment; and improving the UIF benefit regime through the introduction 
of standardised measures and other reforms (with reference to the indexation 
of benefits, utilising a minimum wage arrangement as a basis for benefit 
enhancement, adjusting the contribution rate, and developing a streamlined 
adjudication framework).
2  The need for reform and the vision of a comprehensive social 
security system
As noted before,3 the unemployment protection system in South Africa 
currently favours social insurance by means of contributions in the case of 
formal employment and neglects to provide for unemployment protection by 
means of social assistance. While the UIF is not the appropriate instrument 
for the provision of unemployment protection by means of social assistance, 
it has to be considered how the UIF should be reformed in order to ensure 
an improved unemployment insurance mechanism in the country, and to 
effect meaningful alignment with the rest of the social security system in 
South Africa. Income security in the form of unemployment protection must 
encompass those in the formal labour market, those in the informal labour 
market and those who have never worked or have been actively seeking work 
for a long time. This is a particular challenge. 
In addition, measures adopted with regard to unemployment protection 
must make provision for short-term and long-term needs, taking into account 
the constitutional focus on vulnerability and on those whose needs are 
most urgent.4 The question therefore is how the UIF, given the particular 
orientation of the Fund at present, should contribute to such ends. Already in 
2008, an international expert panel remarked:
“The UIF pays benefits to about ten per cent of the approximately four million unemployed persons 
in South Africa. However, its reserves effectively take about R18 billion away from possible 
redistributive measures which could be introduced to alleviate hardship due to unemployment not 
covered by the UIF or caused by other contingencies.”5
3 Govindjee et al (2011) Stell LR 209
4 In Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) para 42 the Court 
remarked: 
   “Reasonableness must also be understood in the context of the Bill of Rights as a whole  A society must 
seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are provided to all if it is to be a society based on human 
dignity, freedom and equality  To be reasonable, measures cannot leave out of account the degree and 
extent of the denial of the right they endeavour to realise  Those whose needs are the most urgent and 
whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril, must not be ignored by the measures aimed 
at achieving realisation of the right ”
 See also Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 10 BCLR 1033 (CC) paras 68, 78; Khosa 
v The Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v The Minister of Social Development 2004 6 BCLR 569 
(CC) para 74; and, most recently, Beja v Premier of the Western Cape (21332/10) [2011] ZAWCHC 97 (29-
04-2011) paras 95, 99, 101-102, 141 <http://www saflii org/za/cases/ZAWCHC/2011/97 html> (accessed 
06-06-2011)
5 International Expert Panel Consultation Report: Observations on Social Security Reform in South 
Africa (2008) para 4 (Annexure to Department of Social Development Creating Our Future: Strategic 
Considerations for a Comprehensive System of Social Security (Discussion Paper) (2008) 50)
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However, the surplus is certainly not inexhaustible6 and should be restricted 
to serve the clients of the Fund who contributed to the UIF, and their dependants. 
In fact, scenarios calculated for the UIF indicate that the surplus may only 
succeed in accelerating the implementation of a few initiatives in an attempt 
to plug the gaps in the current system.7 The reality of such a limitation is that 
the prioritisation and sequencing of the initiatives attempted assumes greater 
importance. In the end, other solutions may have to be considered, such as 
expanding the funding base of the UIF,8 or allocating fiscal responsibility for 
certain interventions to other sources of income outside the UIF framework.
There are also several other considerations which emphasise the need for 
reform of the UIF. The key considerations in this regard relate to: 
The lack of alignment of the UIF system with constitutional imperatives • 
and with international and regional standards;9 
insufficient links between the UIF and labour market policies, including • 
the absence of an appropriate interface between unemployment insurance 
and labour market activation measures, including employment services, 
job-seeking and placement, skills training interventions, and reintegration 
into the labour market;10
unsatisfactory legal and operational arrangements regarding certain issues • 
of crucial importance to the labour market role of the UIF, with particular 
reference to skills training in South Africa and the envisaged legislative 
framework informing the establishment of public employment services in 
South Africa;11
the need to develop synergies at various levels with the rest of the social • 
security system – including at the levels of policy synergy, institutional 
coordination, service delivery streamlining, benefit design and a shared 
registry/database;12
the need for institutional reform and alignment;• 13
unjustifiable exclusions of major categories of employees from UIF • 
coverage, while coverage extension to other categories should in the longer-
term be considered;14 
addressing certain material deficiencies and inconsistencies in the UIF • 
legislation, relating to issues such as removing the restriction on certain 
6 By 2009 this surplus had grown to R23 5 billion (UIF Annual Report of the Unemployment Insurance 
Fund for the Year Ended 31 March 2010 (2010) 91)  However, it has been noted in the actuarial report 
for the UIF that while the Fund was in a sound financial position to weather the recession, bad economic 
conditions may deplete its cash stores by up to R9 billion by 2013: Anonymous “Recession Threatens 
UIF Cash” (08-09-2009) Insurance Junction <http://www insurancejunction co za/news/2009/09/08/
recession-threatens-uif-cash asp> (accessed 06-05-2011)
7 M Olivier (assisted by O Dupper, A Govindjee & A Wolvaardt) (in association with Aon (Pty) Ltd) 
Redesigning the South African Unemployment Insurance Fund: Reform Proposals (Report prepared for 
the UIF) (2009) 111-155
8 See part 7 3 below
9 See part 3 below
10 See Govindjee et al (2011) Stell LR 213-224
11 213-224
12 See part 4 below
13 See part 4 below  
14 See Dupper et al (2010) Stell LR 446-462
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contributors to benefit and properly redefining the range of dependants who 
should benefit;15
re-aligning the current UIF benefit regime, to enable the UIF to concentrate • 
in future on dealing with the consequences of (and to some extent the 
prevention of) loss of employment;16 and
improving the UIF benefit regime through the introduction of standardised • 
measures and other reforms with reference to an increase in the minimum 
income replacement rate, increasing the income replacement rate in the 
event of maternity, the indexation of benefits, reducing the benefit waiting 
period, utilising a minimum wage arrangement as a basis for benefit 
enhancement, adjusting the contribution rate, and developing a streamlined 
adjudication framework.17 
While multi-faceted reform of unemployment insurance is evidently 
required to deal with the range of challenges, deficiencies and shortcomings 
indicated above, extending unemployment protection in South Africa also has 
to be located within the context of the vision of a comprehensive social security 
system and the need to develop a co-ordinated social security framework for 
South Africa. This broader context is closely associated with several initiatives 
taken by the South African government, including: 
Recommendations made in the 2002 report of the Cabinet-appointed • 
Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for 
South Africa (the so-called “Taylor Committee”);18
Government’s resolve to prioritise the introduction of such a comprehensive • 
framework, appearing among others from discussion papers emanating 
from National Treasury19 and the Department of Social Development,20 
and the establishment of an Inter-departmental Task Team on Social 
Security, which has been spearheading several reports and engaging with a 
range of issues related to this theme; and
Governmental pronouncement to this effect reflected in Government’s • 
Medium Term Strategic Framework and Programme (“NMTSF”) of 
Action 2009-2014.21 The NMTSF confirms a vision of society in which 
“people who are able to work have access to decent jobs, workers’ rights are 
protected and social security measures are comprehensive enough to cover 
all citizens in need”.22
15 See part 5 below
16 See part 6 below
17 See part 7 below
18 Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa Consolidated 
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa: 
Transforming the Present - Protecting the Future (2002)  
19 See, among others, National Treasury Social Security and Retirement Reform (Second Discussion Paper) 
(2007)  
20 Department of Social Development Creating Our Future: Strategic Considerations for a Comprehensive 
System of Social Security (Discussion Paper) (2008)  
21 Presidency Together Doing More and Better: Medium Term Strategic Framework - a Framework to 
Guide Government’s Programme in the Electoral Mandate Period (2009 – 2014) (2009)
22 Presidency Together Doing More and Better 5
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In this regard, however, it has to be noted, that there is no compelling and 
encompassing national strategic framework document which contains a vision 
on the linkages between two core priorities (ie comprehensive social security 
and job promotion/labour market policies), as is also evident in the area of 
unemployment protection.23 
3  Alignment with international and regional standards
3 1  Constitutional relevance of international standards
International law instruments are an important source when reforms to the 
UIF are considered. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(“the Constitution”) adopts an interpretation approach that is international 
law-friendly. According to section 231(2) of the Constitution, an international 
agreement binds the Republic after it has been approved by resolution in both 
houses of Parliament.24 Such agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is 
enacted into law by national legislation.25 Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution 
provides that when interpreting the fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights, 
every court, tribunal and forum must consider international law. Foreign 
law (for example of another country) may be considered.26 While binding 
international law (such as ratified International Labour Organisation (“ILO”) 
Conventions) has to be applied, both binding and non-binding international 
law must be considered when the constitutional fundamental rights are 
interpreted27 – such as relevant ILO Conventions (including those that have 
not been ratified by South Africa) and ILO recommendations concerning 
unemployment. In addition, section 233 of the Constitution states:
“When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the 
legislation that is consistent with international law over any reasonable interpretation that is 
inconsistent with international law.”28
23 See Govindjee et al (2011) Stell LR 205  
24 Unless it is an international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an agreement 
which does not require either ratification or accession, entered into by the national executive  According 
to s 231(3) of the Constitution, such an agreement binds the Republic without approval by the National 
Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, but must be tabled in the Assembly and the Council 
within a reasonable time
25 S 233(4) of the Constitution  However, a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been 
approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament
26 S 39(1)(c) of the Constitution
27 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 35; Government of RSA v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 
(CC) para 26  For examples of reliance on a non-binding ILO Convention (ie ILO Convention 158 of 1982 
on Termination of Employment, not ratified by South Africa), see Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines 
Ltd (Rustenburg Section) 2008 2 SA 24 (CC) para 61 and Karras t/a Floraline v SA Scooter & Transport 
Allied Workers Union 2000 21 ILJ 2612 (LAC) para 27
28 For an application of this principle, see NUMSA v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd 2003 2 BCLR 182 (CC) para 
33, where the Constitutional Court emphasised that an interpretation which would take into account 
principles contained in relevant ILO Conventions is to be preferred over an interpretation to the contrary  
With reference to principles which could be distilled from ILO Conventions 87 of 1948 (on freedom of 
association and the right to organise) and 98 of 1949 (on the right to organise and collective bargaining), 
the Court ruled that minority unions and their members do indeed have the right to strike in order to 
compel an employee to recognise the union’s shop stewards  The same international law-friendly approach 
was adopted by the Court in the case of Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 
11 BCLR 1169 (CC) paras 27-32, where the Court took extensive notice of the provisions of the UN 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) of 1966 and the approach 
400 STELL LR 2011 2
       
In view of the above, international (law) standards provide a benchmark 
for the evaluation of the South African unemployment protection system 
and, more particularly, the Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 (“UIA”) 
and the UIF. The applicable standards are mostly relevant Conventions and 
Recommendations of the ILO, and in some cases also relevant Southern 
Africa Development Community (“SADC”) standards. 
In the rest of part 3 that follows below, we will consider some of the UIF 
areas which are in need of reform from the perspective of relevant international 
and regional standards.
3 2  UIF areas in need of reform from the perspective of the ILO 
Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention 102 of 1952
ILO Convention 102 of 1952 (“Convention 102”) is the core convention of the 
ILO dealing with social security. It is the only instrument which sets minimum 
standards for the nine branches of social security, of which unemployment 
benefits is one. South Africa has not yet ratified this Convention. 
Whereas Convention 102 covers all branches, it requires that only three 
of these branches be ratified by Member states. While the choice as to which 
of the nine to accept rests with the State, at least one of the three branches 
ratified must cover a long-term contingency or unemployment.29 It therefore 
follows that by complying with the standards set in the unemployment part 
of Convention 102, South Africa would move closer to being in a position to 
ratify this particular Convention. Changes to the current UIF system required 
to make the system compliant with the provisions of Convention 102 relate 
mainly to the following:
Minimum income replacement rate• : Convention 102 prescribes that the 
minimum unemployment benefit should equal a replacement rate of not 
less than 45% of previous earnings.30 The current UIF benefit framework 
is not fully compliant with this requirement. The maximum income 
replacement rate is fixed at 60%, while the minimum rate is currently set at 
38%.31 However, the Minister of Labour may vary the minimum income 
replacement rate with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance,32 after 
consultation with the Board of the UIF,33 and by announcement by way of 
notice in the Government Gazette.34 It should be noted that comparative 
research also indicates that the current 38% replacement rate is well below 
towards the interpretation of the Covenant provisions adopted by the relevant supervising organ
29 Art 2 of Convention 102
30 Art 22, read with arts 66-67, as well as the Schedule to Part XI (Periodical payments to Standard 
Beneficiaries)
31 Sch 2, read with s 12(3)(b), of the UIA 
32 S 12(3)(a)
33 S 12(4)(a)
34 S 55 read with s 12(4)(b)
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the norm in other developed and developing countries, where the rate 
ranges between 50% and 90% of previous earnings.35 
Waiting period• : Convention 102 allows for a waiting period of seven days 
before benefits are payable.36 In South Africa, the UIA provides that an 
unemployed contributor is entitled to unemployment benefits if the period 
of unemployment is longer than fourteen days.37 The waiting period 
provided by the UIA in South Africa therefore appears too long and not in 
line with that provided by international standards. In order to align the UIF 
with international standards, the UIA waiting period should be reduced to 
seven days.
3 3  The importance of aligning the UIF with the provisions and 
requirements of the ILO Unemployment Convention 2 of 1919
The ILO Unemployment Convention 2 of 1919 (“Unemployment 
Convention”) has been ratified by (and is therefore binding on) South 
Africa.38 It provides for reciprocity of treatment. In essence, the Convention 
compels member states, via mutually agreed arrangements which could 
include bilateral agreements or national legislation, to afford to migrant 
workers in their respective states benefit rates on the same basis as citizens of 
the country.39 
South Africa is not fully in compliance with this Convention, which is 
binding on the country. The following areas need to be addressed in order to 
ensure compliance with this binding Convention:
3 3 1  Exclusion of migrant workers 
The UIA excludes from unemployment insurance persons who enter the 
Republic for the purpose of carrying out a contract, if by law or as a result of 
a contractual agreement or undertaking there exists an obligation that such 
person must leave the country upon termination of the contract.40 In essence, 
it excludes non-citizens working on a fixed-term contract basis from access 
to the unemployment insurance system. And yet, it is evident from the same 
legislation that fixed-term contract workers, who are citizens of South Africa, 
are specifically included under UIF coverage.41
Apart from the fact that this form of nationality-based discrimination can 
hardly be constitutionally justified, this provision appears to be in conflict 
35 See Olivier et al Redesigning the South African Unemployment Insurance Fund 206-212 as well as OECD 
“Benefits and Wages: OECD Indicators” (01-2010) OECD <www oecd org/els/social/workincentives> 
(accessed 06-05-2011)
36 Art 24(3) of Convention 102  The more recent, unemployment protection-specific Convention, the ILO 
Employment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment Convention 168 of 1988, also stipulates 
that unemployment benefits should be paid after a waiting period of no more than seven days, or where a 
declaration is made in terms of Art 5 of the Convention, no longer than ten days
37 S 16(1) of the UIA
38 Ratification took place on 20-02-1924: see ILO “Ratifications: by country or by Convention” ILOLEx 
<http://www ilo org/ilolex/english/newratframeE htm> (accessed 06-05-2011)  
39 Art 3 of the Unemployment Convention
40 S 3(1)(d) of the UIA; s 4 (1)(d) of the Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act 4 of 2002
41 S 16(1)(a)(i) of the UIA
402 STELL LR 2011 2
       
with South Africa’s obligations under the Unemployment Convention – at least 
as far as non-citizens from countries that have also ratified this Convention 
are concerned. Practical difficulties that may arise to effect cross-border 
payments, and to verify the continued unemployed status of beneficiaries for 
this purpose, could be dealt with by introducing mechanisms which apply in 
the social assistance area.42 In addition, suitable bilateral agreements can be 
entered into with relevant countries to make appropriate arrangements in this 
regard – as appears from the discussion immediately below. 
3 3 2  The need to enter into appropriate bilateral agreements 
The Convention stipulates that member states should, upon terms being 
agreed between the Members concerned, make arrangements whereby 
workers belonging to one Member and working in the territory of another, 
shall be admitted to the same rates of benefit of such insurance as those which 
obtain for the workers belonging to the latter.43
Giving effect to this requirement of the Convention would ideally require 
a statutory basis and framework for entering into bilateral agreements. And 
yet, no such provision has been incorporated in the UIA, unlike a range of 
other South African social security laws, which do provide for formalised 
cross-border arrangements – for example, the Compensation for Occupational 
Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (“COIDA”),44 the Occupational 
Diseases in Mines and Works Act 78 of 1973 (“ODMWA”),45 the Road 
Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (“RAFA”)46 and the Social Assistance Act 13 
of 2004 (“SAA”).47
The reality is also that South Africa has not yet entered into any bilateral 
agreement to give effect to this provision. In fact, in the absence of a multilateral 
arrangement including South Africa, there are only a few examples and little 
use made of bilateral social security agreements and effective portability 
42 As noted before (see Dupper et al (2010) Stell LR 457), s 16 of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004, read 
with Reg 31, makes provision for the payment of a social grant to a beneficiary who will be absent from 
South Africa for a period not exceeding 90 days under certain circumstances  Should such circumstances 
exist and payment be made, the beneficiary has to regularly report to a mission abroad or to any other 
designated office for purposes of identification and verification  This model could be adapted to cover the 
situation of the payment of unemployment insurance to migrant workers
43 Art 3 of the Unemployment Convention
44 S 94 of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, which provides for the possibility 
of bilateral cross-border agreements on the basis of reciprocity between South Africa and another 
country  The reciprocal arrangement has to relate to compensation for employees for accidents resulting 
in disablement or death
45 S 105 of the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act (entitled “Arrangements by commissioner for 
payment of benefits on his behalf”), which stipulates: 
   “The commissioner may with the approval of the Minister make arrangements with any other 
Government Department or any other institution, organization or authority to undertake the payment, 
on behalf of the commissioner, of benefits or other amounts awarded under the previous Act or this 
Act ”
46 S 9 of the Road Accident Fund Act, in terms of which the relevant Minister may, upon the recommendation 
of the Board of the Fund, co-operate and enter into agreements with any public or private institution in 
respect of the reciprocal recognition of compulsory motor vehicle insurance or compulsory motor vehicle 
accidents compensation  The Minister must sign the agreement on behalf of the Fund
47 S 2(1) of the Social Assistance Act, which provides that the Act applies to a non-citizen who resides in 
South Africa, if an agreement between South Africa and the country of which that person is a citizen, 
makes provision for the Social Assistance Act to apply to that person
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arrangements in South African law and practice.48 In this regard South Africa 
appears to be out of step with general developments elsewhere in the world.
It is recommended, firstly, that a provision be introduced in the UIA which 
specifically and appropriately provides for the entering into of bilateral 
agreements in the area of unemployment insurance benefits. Secondly, it 
is recommended that suitable bilateral arrangements be made with other 
countries that have also ratified Convention 102, preferably by way of inter-
state agreements. These arrangements could form part of broader-based social 
security agreements covering other social security benefits as well – such as 
pensions. Other applicable ILO Conventions could be of assistance when these 
agreements are entered into – in particular the Maintenance of Social Security 
Rights Convention 157 of 1982.
3 3 3  Co-ordination of private employment agencies and public 
placement services
The Unemployment Convention requires the co-ordination of the operations 
of public and private employment agencies.49 The recent steps taken by 
the Department of Labour, in particular via the Employment Services Bill 
of 2010,50 to provide for public employment services51 and the regulation 
of private employment agencies52 appear to be steps in the right direction. 
However, the Bill does not appear to co-ordinate the operations of the public 
and private agencies. 
3 4  The value of standards contained in ILO Employment Promotion 
and Protection against Unemployment Convention No 168 of 
1988
Several issues covered by this most recent ILO Convention on unemployment 
provide valuable guidance in further reforming the UIF, and extending UIF 
coverage. Some of the relevant issues include:
3 4 1  Covering workers in the event of partial unemployment and/or 
temporary suspension of work 
The current UIA, unlike the previous UIA, excludes workers from drawing 
UIF benefits if they retain a position despite having lost another position.53 
The only exception in this regard is domestic workers.54
48 M Olivier Reflections on the Feasibility of a Multilateral SADC Social Security Agreement involving 
South Africa and Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe (Report submitted to the ILO) (2010) 
160
49 Art 2(2) of the Unemployment Convention
50 GN 1112 in GG 33873 of 17-12-2010
51 Cls 5-13 (ch 2)
52 Cls 14-20 (ch 3)
53 This flows from the requirement that the contributor must have become unemployed – see s 16(1) of the 
UIA
54 S 12(1A), read with s 13(6)
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The current regulation appears to be contrary to the provisions of Convention 
168 of 1988 (“Convention 168”), which specifically requires the provision of 
benefits in circumstances of partial unemployment.55 This position also loses 
sight of important underlying policy considerations56 – firstly, the fact that a 
person who is allowed to retain benefits while commencing some part-time 
employment will, hopefully, gradually again become independent of the Fund. 
Secondly, if an individual made contributions during the period of occupying 
a particular position, such individual should, in principle, be entitled to claim 
benefits if that particular position has been lost.
Also, the Convention suggests that unemployment benefits should be 
payable in the event of suspension or reduction of earnings due to a temporary 
suspension of work without any break in the employment relationship for 
reasons of, in particular, an economic, technological, structural or similar 
nature.57 This is not currently the case in South Africa in terms of the UIA.58 
There are persuasive legal and factual considerations why unemployment 
benefits should be payable in these cases. As has been noted:59 
“This contingency is legally and factually highly relevant to the South African scenario. The 
suspension of the contract of employment, such as in the event of a protected strike [FGWU v Minister 
of Safety and Security 1999 ILJ 1258 (LC)], or as a result of the employer’s operational requirements, 
legally has the result that the employer’s obligation to pay remuneration and ancillary benefits is 
suspended as well [Stuttafords Department Stores Ltd v SACTWU 2001 BLLR 46 (LAC); 3M SA (Pty) 
Ltd v SACCAWU 2001 BLLR 483 (LAC)].” 
In view of the above, and given the fact that this is a reality with which many 
employees are faced in dire economic circumstances, it is recommended that 
UIF coverage be extended to cover this scenario as well.
3 4 2  Income replacement rate
While it is being argued above that the minimum income UIF benefit income 
replacement rate should be increased to reflect the standard of minimum 45% 
of earnings, in accordance with the provisions of ILO Convention 102,60 
Convention 168 requires this to be raised to 50%.61 Ratification of Convention 
168 would imply that the UIF has to increase the minimum replacement rate 
to 50% of previous earnings.
55 Arts 2 and 10 of Convention 168
56 See MP Olivier & ET van Kerken “Unemployment Insurance” in MP Olivier, E Kalula & N Smit (eds) 
Social Security: A Legal Analysis (2003) 415 448; Dupper et al (2010) Stell LR 454-456  
57 Art 10(2) of Convention 168
58 The payment of benefits in the event of the suspension of the contract of employment necessitated by 
the employer’s operational requirements is clearly not foreseen by the UIA  The Act stipulates that 
unemployment benefits are payable in respect of any period of unemployment if the reason for the 
unemployment is the termination of the contributor’s contract of employment by the employer, the 
dismissal of the contributor, or the ending of a fixed-term contract: s 16(1)(a) of the UIA
59 Olivier & Van Kerken “Unemployment Insurance” in Social Security 449
60 Part 3 2 above
61 Art 15 of Convention 168
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3 4 3  Ensuring that benefits are not forfeited if the unemployed 
worker refuses to take up a non-suitable job offer 
According to the Convention, an unemployed person should not be subject 
to an obligation to take up a job that is not suitable to his or her acquired 
professional and social status,62 during the initial period of unemployment.
However, the UIA stipulates that an unemployed contributor is not entitled 
to unemployment benefits if he or she refuses, without just reason, to undergo 
training and vocational counselling for employment under any scheme.63 
Depending on the nature of the scheme and the purpose of the training, this 
might imply that an unemployed contributor may be compelled to take up a 
position that is not suitable in the sense indicated above.
It is recommended that the UIA be amended to clearly indicate that it is 
not required of an unemployed contributor drawing benefits to accept a non-
suitable position. However, in accordance with the provisions of the 1988 
Convention, accepting such a position might be required when a continuation 
benefit is paid.
3 5  Aligning maternity benefits with the requirements of the ILO 
Maternity Protection Convention 183 of 2000
ILO Maternity Protection Convention 183 of 2000 (“Convention 183”) 
recommends that cash benefits should be at a level which ensures that the 
woman can maintain herself and her child in proper conditions of health 
and with a suitable standard of living.64 This is based on the recognition 
that maternity is a time of extraordinary expenditure where such a benefit 
is entirely appropriate. The Convention therefore requires that the minimum 
income replacement rate should be raised to no less than two-thirds of previous 
earnings in the event of maternity benefits.65 This is also in accordance 
with the provisions of the Code on Social Security in the SADC66 and the 
recommendations made by the Taylor Committee in South Africa.67
Therefore, it is recommended that the amount of such benefits should not 
be less than two-thirds of the woman’s previous earnings or of such of those 
earnings as are taken into account for the purpose of calculating benefits, 
as required by Convention 183. Setting the minimum benefit levels at this 
rate stipulated by the ILO Convention will not only align the UIF with 
international and regional standards, but will also facilitate the ratification 
62 Art 10(1)  According to art 21(2), in assessing the suitability of employment, account shall be taken, in 
particular, under prescribed conditions and to an appropriate extent, of the age of unemployed persons, 
their length of service in their former occupation, their acquired experience, the length of their period of 
unemployment, the labour market situation, the impact of the employment in question on their personal 
and family situation and whether the employment is vacant as a direct result of a stoppage of work due to 
an on-going labour dispute
63 S 16(2) of the UIA
64 Art 6 2 of Convention 183
65 Art 6 3
66 SADC Code on Social Security in the SADC (2007) art 8 3  
67 Committee of Inquiry into a System of Comprehensive Social Security for South Africa Transforming the 
Present - Protecting the Future 72
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of this instrument. Most importantly, it will give recognition to the fact that 
maternity is a time of extraordinary expenditure.
4  The need to develop synergies with the rest of the social 
security system and for institutional reform and alignment
4 1  Implications flowing from a comprehensive social security 
system
Creating a comprehensive social security system requires the development 
of synergies, co-ordination, cooperation and integrated frameworks and 
approaches. This is especially true of South Africa, where the social security 
system is characterised by a high degree of fragmentation and duplication at 
all levels – including the policy, legal, adjudicative, institutional, operational, 
funding and service delivery levels. In short, a common vision and framework 
is lacking. The need to address these shortcomings has been central to the 
work of the Inter-departmental Task Team on Social Security (“IDTT”) 
and the documents emanating from this institution68 and the participating 
government departments.69
These initiatives naturally affect the unemployment insurance system as 
well. Integration of the unemployment insurance scheme with other social 
security arrangements in South Africa in principle involves a vast range of 
interventions. From an operational perspective, these concern, among others, 
an integrated social security contribution framework, streamlined collection of 
contributions, the establishment of a common registry, shared benefit payment 
facilities and arrangements, a common regulator, and common monitoring 
and external dispute resolution institutions. Thought should also be given to 
implementing a case management approach, whereby (at least some) officials 
serving in the different social security branches are adequately equipped to 
render a holistic service to social security clients, including potential and 
actual clients of the UIF. Such an approach would support the emphasis on 
integrative models demanded by a comprehensive and aligned social security 
system.
At a higher level, interfacing regarding policy-making and co-ordinated 
institutional frameworks is crucial for the medium to long term roll-out of an 
integrated and comprehensive social security system in South Africa. From 
a scheme and benefit design perspective, considerable scope for integration 
and common approaches exists. This is also true of the area of harmonisation 
of benefits. Where this is possible and will bring about synchronisation 
of the social security system, it should be done. For example, it should be 
interrogated whether and, if so, to what extent the range of dependants and their 
entitlement to benefits are regulated differently and often inconsistently by the 
various social security laws – as currently appears to be the case. However, 
68 See among others IDTT Comprehensive Social Protection: Overview (A consultation document, 
prepared for the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Social Security, Retirement Reform and National Health 
Insurance) (2010)
69 See National Treasury Social Security and Retirement Reform and Department of Social Development 
Creating Our Future: Strategic Considerations for a Comprehensive System of Social Security
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harmonisation or synchronisation of dependants’ (ie survivors’) benefits 
would require agreement on an appropriate framework for the payment of 
dependants’ benefits, as it is apparent that in some contexts “dependant” is 
defined narrowly,70 while in other contexts a broad definition71 has been 
adopted. Also, the nature, quality and quantity (with specific reference to the 
monetary value) of dependants’ benefits vary extensively across the social 
security system.
Moreover, it is evident that that skills training, and early return to work 
policies for occupationally injured workers and for unemployed workers could 
to a large extent be streamlined and integrated – amounting to considerable 
savings for the system as a whole. In the area of medical rehabilitation, 
synergies can clearly be developed between, for example, the employment 
injury scheme, the road accident insurance system, and the (envisaged) national 
system of health insurance. It should also be possible to subsume sickness 
benefits, currently provided by the UIF, under the envisaged (national) health 
insurance system.
Another area where an integrated approach is required, relates to the 
re-alignment of the unemployment insurance scheme, discussed below.72
4 2  UIF-specific considerations and constraints impacting on the 
vision of a comprehensive social security system
There are particular considerations and substantive constraints, which both 
define and circumscribe the extent and content of the alignment of the UIF 
that is currently considered. These considerations and constraints relate in 
particular to the
compensation (ie income-replacement) function of the UIF;• 
role of the UIF as a labour market instrument, also against the background • 
of the developing public employment services and active labour market 
interventions spearheaded by the Department of Labour; and 
need to recognise unemployment insurance as a separate risk category with • 
a ringfenced contribution (ie funding) and benefit regime framework.
70 As in the case of the UIA (see s 30 and the discussion in part 5 2 below)  The Social Assistance Act does 
not provide for dependants’ or survivors’ benefits
71 For example, s 1 of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 includes both factual and legal dependants  
Also, third party claims in terms of the Road Accident Fund Act effectively subsume a large range of 
dependants’ claims  See also s 1 of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act: a 
dependant includes a widow and widower; a person with whom the employee was living as husband or 
wife; a child under the age of eighteen, including a posthumous child, a step-child, an adopted child and a 
child born out of wedlock; and exceptionally also a child over the age of eighteen years of the employee or 
of his or her spouse, and a parent or any person who in the opinion of the Director-General was acting in 
the place of the parent, a brother, a sister, a half-brother or half-sister, a grandparent or a grandchild of the 
employee; and a parent of the employee or any person who in the opinion of the commissioner was acting 
in the place of the parent, and who was in the opinion of the Director-General at the time of the employee’s 
death wholly or partly financially dependent upon the employee
72 Part 6 below
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These considerations and constraints have a major impact on the design and 
place of the UIF73 in a comprehensive social security system, as well as the 
desired institutional constellation.
4 2 1  The compensation function: Paying UIF benefits, and 
strengthening the UIF’s role through the introduction of an 
enhanced continuation benefit
The UIF has in the first place a compensation function. Based on periods of 
contribution and past work activity, it pays out short-term benefits to workers 
who have lost employment and provides some level of income replacement, 
granting workers a period of time to find suitable alternative work. 
However, the short-term nature of unemployment benefits provided by the 
UIF is linked to the assumption that unemployment is cyclical.74 This is not 
the case in South Africa: almost 60% of the unemployed were in long-term 
unemployment in 2009, ie for one year or longer.75 This proportion has been 
steadily rising.76
In view of this, and in order to assist workers covered by the UIF and 
who have exhausted their unemployment benefits, the introduction of a flat 
rate continuation benefit of limited duration has been proposed as part of 
developing a comprehensive social security system77 – in this way ascribing 
an enhanced role to the UIF. This will be offered only to the eligible population 
under the UIF, has been actuarially costed,78 and will be funded via the 
contributions paid by employers and employees. As such, the continuation 
benefit allows for basic protection for an extended period. Whether and, if 
so, to what extent access to the continuation benefit will be conditional upon 
participation/involvement in labour market activation measures, is currently 
under consideration. The advantage of such an approach is that it will allow 
those in receipt of the continuation benefit to improve their chances of being 
re-integrated into the formal labour market.79 It has been emphasised that a 
continuation grant, in particular for older workers, fills a significant gap in the 
present income protection arrangements, and is a necessary complement to 
the intended preservation of retirement benefits until old age.80
73 And for that matter also the Compensation Fund of South Africa, as the same considerations do apply in 
the case of that Fund
74 See, for example, Olivier & Van Kerken “Unemployment Insurance” in Social Security 419
75 See Statistics South Africa Labour Market Dynamics in South Africa 2009 (2010) 6-12 <http://www
statssa gov za/publications/Report-02-11-02/Report-02-11-022009 pdf> (accessed 06-05-2011)
76 Even on a year-on-year basis: 
   “In year ended in December 2009, the increase in the number of persons that were unemployed reflected 
an increase in those that were in long-term unemployment (up from 2,4 million in 2008 to 2,5 million in 
2009)” – Statistics South Africa Labour Market Dynamics 6-12
77 See IDTT Comprehensive Social Protection: Overview 6; Department of Social Development Creating 
our Future 19
78 Olivier et al Redesigning the South African Unemployment Insurance Fund 39-45
79 44  See also Govindjee et al (2011) Stell LR 210, 213-214, 216-217, 223, 226
80 IDTT Comprehensive Social Protection: Overview 6  
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4 2 2  The UIF as a labour market instrument
Until recently, the UIF has almost exclusively focused on the payment of 
benefits to covered workers and their dependants. In essence, the current 
UIA focuses on compensation (ie paying benefits) to some (workers) who 
become unemployed, while not paying adequate attention to the preventive 
and re-integrative role of an unemployment protection system, in particular 
the unemployment insurance scheme.81
Lately, however, the UIF has become involved in several initiatives 
which, generally speaking, fall within the domain of Active Labour Market 
Policies (“ALMPs”)/measures. These initiatives are aimed at ensuring 
continued employment, supporting employability, providing training and job 
placement:
Special financial incentives were put in place during the recent recession to • 
ensure security of employment of certain workers;82
the UIF Board approved a sum of R2 billion to be invested with the • 
Industrial Development Corporation (“IDC”) to be used as part of the 
capital available to assist sectors in distress;83 and
the UIF piloted (in Gauteng) a Training of the Unemployed scheme, • 
approved by the Minister of Labour, to train and permanently place 300 
candidates with two government departments.84
Of course, a caveat needs to be expressed. In many countries unemployment 
insurance contributions finance ALMPs for the insured. However, 
unemployment insurance revenues are not used to exclusively finance 
training on any substantial scale to the population at large – ie those who are 
unemployed but who are not contributors/beneficiaries/clients of the relevant 
unemployment insurance scheme. Therefore, also in the South African 
context, it is in fact incumbent on the State to address the (training) needs 
of the unemployed, both insured and non-insured. Within the South African 
context, given the earmarked 20% of its levy on employers, the National Skills 
Fund (“NSF”) is legally responsible to serve the unemployed and people in the 
informal economy.85 The task of the UIF in this regard should be restricted 
to those covered by the Fund. This also flows from the nature of the UIF as 
81 “As a policy instrument the UIA, therefore, does not appear to be well aligned to a policy of preventing 
and combating unemployment, and to reintegrating those who have become unemployed in the labour 
market  Its primary focus is to arrange for measures dealing with the short-term unemployment of those 
who worked as ‘employees’ in the formal sector, and not to impact directly on the comprehensive context 
of mass and long-term structural unemployment in the country ” (Olivier & Van Kerken “Unemployment 
Insurance” in Social Security 418)
82 The most important of these relates to the introduction of a training lay-off scheme by the Department of 
Labour in 2009, which is funded partly by the UIF  (See Department of Labour A Guide to the Training 
Layoff Scheme (2009) <http://www labour gov za/documents/useful-documents/skills-development/
guide-to-training-lay-off-scheme> (accessed 06-05-2011))  
83 IDC “IDC and UIF Announce R2 billion Fund to Create Employment” (14-04-2010) IDC Media Release 
<http://www idc co za/media/media-releases asp?GroupCode=0&ArticleId=232> (accessed 06-05-
2011)
84 Anonymous “Gauteng Training Project Skills the Jobless” (29-06-2010) South Africa: The Good News 
<http://www sagoodnews co za/economy/gauteng_training_project_skills_the_ jobless html> (accessed 
06-05-2011)
85 See s 27(2)(a) of the Skills Development Act 97 of 1998, read with ss 2 and 28 of the same Act
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a social insurance instrument, meant to benefit workers who and for whom 
contributions were made, and their dependants.
The ad hoc measures mentioned above should develop into a more structured 
and systematic involvement of the UIF in ALMPs. Such involvement could 
operate at two levels, ie an individual worker and broader system level:
At the individual worker level, individual clients of the UIF (ie those who • 
contribute(d) to the Fund but who lost employment) should be supported 
to be reintegrated into the labour market through any or a combination 
of ALMP mechanisms, including training or (re)skilling opportunities.86 
Ideally this should apply once the worker has exhausted his or her 
available unemployment benefits and qualifies for a continuation benefit. 
It is suggested that this should be construed as an additional “employment 
benefit”, consisting of an individualised right to training and reintegration 
services.
At the broader system level, but still benefiting its contributor client base, • 
the UIF could become involved in certain preventive measures, such as 
measures to prevent lay-offs during crises (for example, by means of partial 
wage compensation/subsidies, reductions of social security contributions) 
and early intervention measures (such as investing in labour market 
information services and data collection). 
In this way the UIF, in keeping with international trends, fulfils a labour 
market and developmental function. This also emphasises the close involvement 
of the UIF and the Department of Labour in ALMPs, as is evident from the 
provisions of the new Employment Services Bill in relation to, among others, 
public employment services, referred to above. 
The developments described here are not limited to the UIF. Closer 
linkages between the Compensation Fund and labour market (re)integration 
are currently being developed by the Compensation Fund, in particular via a 
new policy framework for the rehabilitation, reintegration and return-to-work 
of workers who have suffered occupational injuries or diseases.87
86 However, this is complicated by the institutional fragmentation that has occurred as a result of the 
transfer of the responsibility for skills training to the Department of Higher Education and Training 
– the implication is that skills training and other aspects relating to labour market integration (such as 
the provision of public employment services) respectively now fall within the functional domain of two 
different Ministries  (The President recently transferred (in terms of s 97 of the Constitution) most of the 
administration, powers and functions pertaining to skills development previously entrusted to the Minister 
of Labour to the Minister of Higher Education and Training (see Proc R56 in GG 32549 of 04-09-2009) 
(“the Presidential Proclamation of 2009”)  Importantly, the Presidential Proclamation of 2009 excluded 
key provisions in the Skills Development Act 97 of 1998 (SDA) relating to the establishment of labour 
centres and employment services, implying that such matters will (still) continue to be the responsibility 
of the Minister of Labour )
87 Department of Labour Strategic Plan for the Department of Labour 2011-2016 (2011) 3-4 <http://www
labour gov za/downloads/documents/annual-reports/department-of-labour-strategic-plan/2011-2016/
strat%20plan%202011parta pdf> (accessed 06-05-2011)  
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4 2 3  The need to recognise unemployment insurance as a separate 
risk category with a ringfenced contribution (ie funding) and 
benefit regime framework
It has been proposed that 
“all employers and employees should be obliged to contribute at a fixed rate, up to an agreed 
earnings threshold, to a centrally managed National Social Security Fund (NSSF). The new Fund 
will incorporate the present UIF, and will pay unemployment and maternity leave benefits, disability 
and death benefits and a basic retirement pension based on career-average earnings, adjusted for 
inflation.”88 
Reference is also made to the 
“adoption of a mandatory savings arrangement as part of a new, consolidated social security 
system providing pension, death, disability and unemployment benefits supported by compulsory 
contributions by all workers earning above a minimum income threshold.”89
There are several reasons why it is necessary to interrogate the proposed 
arrangement. Some of these reasons relate to the range of benefits to be provided 
by the UIF (discussed below),90 the exclusion of workers earning below a 
certain minimum threshold,91 and the need to recognise unemployment 
insurance as a separate risk category with a ringfenced contribution and 
benefit regime framework.
In this latter regard, it needs to be underscored that the particular purpose 
and role of the UIF – as discussed above – require its separate treatment, 
irrespective of where institutionally the UIF will be located in the new social 
security constellation in South Africa. Based on international experience, 
it has been indicated, also by the ILO,92 that good standards in financial 
governance persuasively indicate that there be in principle full separation 
of accounts – and reserves – with appropriate actuarially defined separate 
contribution rates for each different risk. In particular, separating short-term 
and long-term benefits along the lines suggested here is imperative. Unless 
segmentisation of various benefit categories is actively pursued, there is a 
danger of unnecessary cross-subsidisation between different categories of 
88 IDTT Comprehensive Social Protection: Overview 6
89 5
90 See part 6 below
91 It is foreseen that income-earners with an income below about R1 000 per month per annum will be 
excluded from the obligation to contribute to the NSSF: IDTT Comprehensive Social Protection: Overview 
7  From the perspective of retirement benefits, there might be some justification for such an approach  
The reason is that the affected worker will in all probability be entitled to access the state-provided old 
age grant upon retirement  However, the exclusion of the lowest-income earners from accessing UIF 
benefits would be particularly problematic  There are several reasons why this is so  Firstly, the gradual 
scale of benefits (ie the varying income replacement rate – see part 3 2 above) has been introduced by 
the UIA to benefit lower-income earners, as they are entitled to a higher proportion of their income 
than is the case with higher-income earners, should they become unemployed  Secondly, excluding this 
group from accessing unemployment benefits, without providing alternative and comparable benefits in 
the event of unemployment must be seen as a retrogressive step  It is unlikely that this approach can be 
constitutionally countenanced
92 See, for example, ILO Actuarial Valuation of the National Social Security Fund as of 30 June 2006 
Report to the Board of Trustees of the National Social Security Fund (2008) ILO/TF/TANZANIA/R 19 
57-59
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benefits.93 There are, therefore, ample reasons to opt for a separate accounting 
and fund management arrangement, and a separate reserve, as far as the UIF 
is concerned. Consequently, even if it could in other contexts be suggested 
that accounts and contribution rates be fully unified for the sake of simplicity 
of the NSSF scheme and given the particular social demographic conditions 
in the country, this could certainly not be said of the UIF. 
Finally, it should be remarked that the international experience 
overwhelmingly indicates that unemployment insurance is, with little 
exception, being treated as a separate risk category. As remarked in a recent 
document,94 only 9.1% of countries offer unemployment insurance through 
the same public entity offering retirement, disability and survivor benefits. 
Furthermore, comparative evidence indicates that the contribution rates for 
unemployment insurance are in most cases specified and ringfenced, and 
almost without exception meant to pay for unemployment (and at times 
unemployment-related) benefits.95
In view of the above, it is suggested that the UIF should not be incorporated or 
subsumed under the NSSF, as part of the proposed NSSF “common platform”. 
Furthermore, with reference to international experience and standards, it is 
recommended that the contribution rate regime in relation to the UIF has to be 
ringfenced, and used solely towards unemployment insurance benefits, bearing 
in mind that there is some scope for benefit adjustment, as well as benefit 
harmonisation, as discussed above96 in relation to dependants’ benefits.
5  Addressing certain material deficiencies and inconsistencies 
in the UIF legislation: Removing the restriction on certain 
contributors to benefit and redefining the range of 
dependants
In addition to the shortcomings in the present UIA discussed in the first two 
contributions, relating in particular to coverage exclusions97 and the absence 
of a sufficient legislative nexus between the compensation focus (passive 
labour market context) and the desired labour market integration framework 
(active labour market interventions) of the UIF,98 certain other material 
deficiencies and inconsistencies also appear from the UIA. In this part we 
concentrate on two issues: the restriction on certain contributors to benefit, 
and the inchoate notion of “dependant”.
93 ILO Actuarial Valuation of the National Social Security Fund 57-59  See also L Barbone & LB Sanchez 
“Pensions and Social Security in Sub-Saharan Africa – Issues and Options” in ISSA Social Security in 
Africa: New Realities (2000) 15; M Olivier “Acceptance of Social Security in Africa” in ISSA Proceedings 
of 15th African International Social Security Association Regional Conference (2006) 39
94 IDTT Alignment of Risk Benefits Provided by Social Security Agencies (2010) 61
95 See Olivier et al Redesigning the South African Unemployment Insurance Fund 206-212
96 Part 4 1 above  
97 Dupper et al (2010) Stell LR 438
98 Govindjee et al (2011) Stell LR 205
SOUTH AFRICAN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE FUND 413
       
5 1  Removing the restriction on certain contributors to benefit
According to section 14 of the UIA a contributor is not entitled to UIF 
benefits under certain circumstances. These circumstances relate among 
others to any period that the contributor was in receipt of certain other benefits, 
despite the fact that contributions to the UIF may have been deducted and paid 
over to the Fund. The contributor apparently loses his or her entitlement to 
any UIF benefits if other benefits emanating from a source covered by the 
section are received (ie a benefit obtained from the Compensation Fund,99 or 
a benefit from any unemployment fund or scheme established by a bargaining 
or statutory council).100 This appears to be the position despite the fact that 
the (periodic) amount received from the other source may be less than the UIF 
amount. 
Whether a contributor should be entitled to UIF benefits (or possibly reduced 
UIF benefits) in the event that Compensation Fund benefits are received raises 
complex issues of a legal and policy nature, and will not be further explored 
in this contribution.101 One particular consideration concerns the question 
whether and, if so, to what extent it is desirable to let a person claim from 
different public social security schemes simultaneously on the basis of the 
same set of facts. It should be noted that existing statutory provisions are 
unclear, conflicting or inconsistent.102
As has been noted,103 it is inconsistent and wrong in principle to exclude 
UIF contributors from drawing UIF benefits in the event that they may have 
an entitlement to a bargaining or statutory council unemployment fund or 
scheme payment. It is inconsistent, since in the case of UIF illness, maternity 
and adoption benefits special provision is made to ensure that the benefit 
received from that other source and the UIF benefit together are not more than 
the remuneration that the contributor would have received if the contributor 
did not become unemployed.104 It is wrong in principle as contributors who, 
partly through their own premiums, have built up entitlements over a period 
of time, should be allowed to claim at least that amount which constitutes the 
difference between the benefits paid out from another source and the UIF 
99 S 14(a)(ii) of the UIA
100 S 14(a)(iii)
101 See the recent ostensibly conflicting judgments of the South Gauteng High Court in Makhuvela v Road 
Accident Fund 2010 1 SA 29 (SGHC) 29 and the Supreme Court of Appeal in Road Accident Fund v 
Timis (29/09) [2010] ZASCA 30 (26-03-2010) <http://www saflii org/za/cases/ZASCA/2010/30 html> 
(accessed 06-06-2011); JP van Niekerk “Makhuvela v Road Accident Fund” (2009) 12 JILB 146
102 While s 53 of the COIDA stipulates that (among others) a social assistance payment may be taken into 
account by the Compensation Fund, the position in terms of other public scheme arrangements may be 
different  For example, a UIF beneficiary/dependant could be receiving both an old age grant and an 
unemployment insurance benefit  Also, the UIA does not prohibit “double-dipping” in respect of other 
public funds such as the Road Accident Fund  Furthermore, the UIA is not entirely consistent as far as 
entitlement to different categories of UIF benefits is concerned, as it provides that the entitlement to 
unemployment, illness and adoption benefits may not be reduced by the payment of maternity benefits in 
terms of the UIA (s 13(5))  There is evidently an emphatic need for statutory reform in this area, which is 
sensitive to both the different and, at times, conflicting public policy considerations, and the overarching 
constitutional rights domain
103 Olivier & Van Kerken “Unemployment Insurance” in Social Security 432
104 See ss 21(2), 24(3) and 27(4) of the UIA respectively
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benefit, if the latter is in excess of the former. In essence then, a reduction in 
the amount of unemployment benefits would have been more appropriate.
The effect of this provision is that, although employers and employees who 
are involved in a council scheme remain obliged to contribute to the Fund, 
unemployed contributors will have to forfeit their (periodic) benefits which 
they had expected to be entitled to under the council scheme. This provision 
is likely to discourage councils to arrange for unemployment benefits on 
this basis and it is likely that councils will discontinue their unemployment 
schemes, at least to the extent that periodic payments are envisaged, since 
these will impose a double burden and yield no advantage.105
There is yet a further anomaly: if the employee has made private provision 
for the contingency of unemployment, payment of unemployment benefits 
is not forfeited. One has great difficulty in understanding the discrepancy 
between occupational-based (council) payments and private payments. 
It is submitted that it is unconscionable to impose an obligation to contribute 
to the statutory scheme and yet refuse entitlement to benefits for the mere 
reason that there is an entitlement under another scheme. Therefore, in view 
of the range of problems experienced with the exclusions contained in section 
14(a), it is recommended that the relevant parts of this section, which cause 
a contributor to forfeit unemployment benefits if the person was in receipt 
of certain other benefits, despite the fact that contributions may have been 
deducted and paid over to the UIF, be thoroughly reviewed.106
5 2  Redefining the range of dependants
A dependant is entitled to the various benefits provided for by the 
Unemployment Insurance Act (UIA).107 The benefit payable is the 
unemployment benefit that would have been payable to the contributor in 
terms of the Act if the contributor had been alive.108 
Section 30 of the UIA defines a dependant as:
“(i)  primarily, the surviving spouse or a life partner of a deceased contributor;109 and
(ii)  secondarily, any dependent child of a deceased contributor if (a) there is no surviving spouse or 
life partner; or (b) the surviving spouse or life partner has not made application for the benefits 
within six months of the contributor’s death.”110
As has been noted,111 there are several problems with the provision 
contained in section 30. In the first place, the UIA apparently ranks children 
below surviving spouses and life partners, who have claimed. The apparently 
unfounded assumption is that the surviving spouse will look after the child and 
105 It is, therefore, likely that the prohibition will effectively – contrary to the intention of the legislature – 
transfer the burden of unemployment provision to the State
106 It is worth noting that in terms of the provisions of the unpublished and undated Unemployment Insurance 
Amendment Bill of 2010 (on file with the authors) it is suggested that s 14(a) be deleted
107 S 12(1) of the UIA
108 S 30(3)
109 S 30(1): provided that the application for benefits has been made within six months of the death of the 
contributor (s 30(1)(b))
110 S 30(2)
111 Olivier & Van Kerken “Unemployment Insurance” in Social Security 444
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that for this reason the child can only claim if the spouse has not done so.112 
This of course raises constitutional considerations, in view of the protected 
status enjoyed by children, also in the area of social security.113
Secondly, it is unclear how extensively the notion of “spouse” should be 
interpreted, as there is no definition of the notion.114 For example, does a 
life-partner or spouse who was married to the deceased employee in terms 
of customary or religious law qualify as a beneficiary if there was also a civil 
law marriage with another person subsisting at the time of the employee’s 
death?115 Thirdly, no age restriction with regard to children is mentioned.
It is submitted that the primary question should be whether a person was or 
would have been (wholly or mainly) financially dependent on the deceased. In 
the event of more than one dependant, there should either be a clear ranking 
of would be beneficiaries, or an equitable sharing of the benefits (much along 
the same lines as is the case with pension/provident fund payments in terms 
of the provisions of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956).116
6  Re-aligning the current UIF benefit regime to focus on loss of 
employment 
As suggested above,117 the central task of unemployment insurance is 
to pay unemployment benefits and to serve as a labour market instrument. 
Consideration should therefore be given to separate unemployment insurance 
benefits (ie benefits which are payable in the event of loss of employment) 
from other unemployment-related benefits such as sickness, maternity and 
adoption benefits. This would mean that the Fund could in the medium- to long 
112 The assumption would of course be unfounded where, for example, the child of the deceased is not the 
child of the surviving spouse
113 S 28 of the Constitution, read with s 27(1)(c)
114 S 38(7) of the UIA 30 of 1966, apart from its shortcomings, was much more precise  It stipulated: 
   “For the purpose of this section–
   (a)  ‘dependant’ means–
   (i)  the widow or widower of the deceased contributor;
   (ii)   any child (including an adopted child) of the deceased contributor who was under the age of 
seventeen years at the date of the death of the contributor and who was, in the opinion of the 
board, wholly or mainly dependent upon the contributor for the necessities of life; or
   (iii)  any other person who was, in the opinion of the board, wholly or mainly dependent upon the 
deceased contributor for the necessities of life;
   (b)       
   (c)   ‘widow’ includes any woman who was a participant in a customary union according to indigenous 
law and custom, where neither the man nor the woman was a party to a subsisting marriage ”
115 Whether the exclusion of any of these categories of de facto dependants will eventually pass constitutional 
and equality muster, is debatable, given the constitutional prohibition of unfair discrimination based on 
marital status, religion and sexual orientation  See Langemaat v Minister of Safety & Security 1998 ILJ 
20 (T); Hafiza Ismail Amod (born Peer) & Commission for Gender Equality v Multilateral Motor Vehicle 
Accidents Fund CC 29-09-1999 case no 444/98  This is also the approach adopted by the Pension Funds 
Adjudicator when determining the range of dependants for purposes of the Pension Funds Act: see Van 
der Merwe v The Southern Life Association Ltd 1999 Juta’s Pension LB 110 (WC) (PFA/WE/21/1/98); 
TWC v Rentokil Pension Fund and DVR 1999 Juta’s Pension LB 120 (KZN) (PFA/KZN/129/98); AT 
Swanepoel v Abrahams & Gross Provident Fund (PFA/WE61/98)
116 See the definition of “dependant” in s 1 of the Pension Funds Act, and the decisions of the Adjudicator in 
Van der Merwe v The Southern Life Association Ltd 1999 Juta’s Pension LB 110 (WC) (PFA/WE/21/1/98); 
TWC v Rentokil Pension Fund and DVR 1999 Juta’s Pension LB 120 (KZN) (PFA/KZN/129/98); AT 
Swanepoel v Abrahams & Gross Provident Fund (PFA/WE61/98)
117 Olivier & Van Kerken “Unemployment Insurance” in Social Security 458
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term become a Fund that caters purely for the contingency of unemployment, 
which would result in a financially strong fund that will provide better benefits 
and eventually possibly even extended benefits, including benefits linked to 
re-integrating unemployed (ex) workers into the labour market. 
The comparative evidence is compelling. While only a few countries 
would provide mixed benefits under their unemployment insurance schemes, 
the common trend discernable in most countries of the world is to separate 
unemployment benefits from family-related and sickness benefits. It is also 
evident118 that in those countries where the unemployment insurance scheme 
provides a mixed range of unemployment-related benefits, the contribution 
rate is markedly higher than in South Africa – of course, in order to ensure 
that the scheme is able to properly cover the said benefits.
As has been noted,119 in many countries maternity benefits (and the same 
applies to adoption benefits) are provided for in separate family benefit schemes. 
Providing for family protection-related social security matters in terms of 
such a separate scheme could have the added advantage that non-formal 
sector maternity situations could also in principle be covered. Furthermore, 
as indicated above,120 it should also be possible to subsume sickness benefits, 
currently provided by the UIF, under the envisaged (national) health insurance 
system.
It is therefore recommended that South Africa consider separating 
unemployment insurance benefits in the strict sense of the word (ie 
benefits accruing to a beneficiary as a result of loss of employment) from 
unemployment-related benefits such as sickness, maternity and adoption 
benefits. It is suggested that these (latter – unemployment-related benefits) be 
catered for under separate schemes designed for family benefits and sickness 
benefits. The reason behind this proposal is that these benefits stretch the 
financial capacity of the UIF and divert the focus of the UIF from pressing 
issues such as re-integrating unemployed (ex) workers into the labour market 
and contributing to preventing and combating unemployment.
7  Improving the UIF benefit regime through the introduction of 
standardised measures and other reforms
In the final part of this contribution, emphasis is placed on the need to 
introduce certain standardised arrangements, in addition to other particular 
reforms, to ensure a streamlined and effective unemployment insurance 
scheme in South Africa. This would enable the UIF to provide enhanced 
material coverage to beneficiaries – as regards both the quality and quantity 
of benefits. Some of the standardised arrangements were discussed earlier in 
this contribution and will not be reflected on again – namely those relating to 
the increase in the minimum income replacement rate,121 the increase in the 
118 See Olivier et al Redesigning the South African Unemployment Insurance Fund 206-212
119 Olivier & Van Kerken “Unemployment Insurance” in Social Security 451
120 Part 4 1 above
121 Parts 3 2 and 3 4 2 above
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income replacement rate in the event of maternity,122 and the reduction of the 
benefit waiting period.123 In this part, focus will be placed on the potential 
relevance of two additional standardised arrangements, namely the indexation 
of benefits and the consideration of utilising a minimum wage arrangement 
as a basis for benefit enhancement. Two further potential reform areas are 
then discussed – raising the contribution rate and developing a streamlined 
adjudication framework involving the UIF as well.
7 1  Benefit indexation
Experience from the UIF shows that although benefits have been adjusted 
periodically, benefit increases have been discretionary, and not linked to or 
aligned with any inflation target – such as the annual consumer price index 
(CPIX). 
The general principle is that benefits paid by a social security scheme need 
to be indexed regularly to maintain their purchasing power. As indicated 
by the ILO, failure to index benefits over a long period or during inflation 
may lead to hardship for recipients.124 In other countries, the maximum and 
minimum benefit levels are updated according to changes in the CPIX, or 
other benchmarks such as changes in the minimum wage.125
It is recommended that the benefits paid by the UIF need to be indexed, 
preferably to the CPIX or the minimum wage in a particular sector (or a 
general minimum wage if this were to be introduced – see below),126 and 
updated regularly to maintain their purchasing power.
7 2  Utilising a minimum wage arrangement as a basis for benefit 
enhancement
South Africa does not have a national minimum wage, although a sectoral 
and/or job type- or job grade-specific minimum wage effectively exists in 
several industries. A potentially positive impact that the implementation of a 
minimum wage can have on unemployment insurance is to ensure that low-paid 
workers will receive a higher minimum benefit level. Because contributions 
are generally calculated as a percentage of income, a higher minimum income 
will ensure that low wage earners will receive higher benefits in the case of 
unemployment.127 Alternatively, one could envisage that an unemployment 
insurance scheme such as the UIF can be designed in a way that deems a wage 
at a particular level to be the “minimum wage”, even though a minimum wage 
122 Part 3 5 above
123 Part 3 2 above
124 ILO Social Insurance and Social Protection: Report of the Director-General (Part 1) (Eightieth sess, 
1993) 22  
125 See, for example, Chile: G Acevedo, P Eskenazi & C Pagés Unemployment Insurance in Chile: A New 
Model of Income Support for Unemployed Workers (SP Discussion Paper No 0612 World Bank) (2006) 
17
126 For a discussion on using the minimum wage as a yardstick in unemployment insurance, see part 7 2 
below
127 J Wenger Mending Unemployment Insurance with the Minimum Wage (Economic Policy Institute Issue 
Brief No 163) (2001) <http://www epi org/publications/entry/issuebriefs_ib163/> (accessed 06-05-2011)
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has not been officially introduced. The result, as far as unemployment benefit 
payments are concerned, will be to raise the benefit level for low-income 
earners.128 One of the positive aspects therefore of the relationship between 
minimum wage and unemployment benefits is that it assists in redistribution 
by ensuring that there is equity in unemployment benefits. 
It is recommended that serious consideration be given to the introduction 
and implementation of a minimum wage, which could then serve as a tool to 
ensure a minimum unemployment insurance benefit; in addition, it could also 
serve other important purposes, including facilitating access to a range of 
other social benefits, and to be used as a tool to benchmark the indexation of 
benefit increases.129
7 3  Adjusting the contribution rate
Earlier mention was made of the limited fiscal ability of the UIF, despite the 
size of its current surplus.130 This could impact negatively on the ability of the 
UIF to meaningfully address the range of reform proposals discussed in this 
contribution and the previous two contributions. It is therefore suggested that 
there may be a need to consider alternative or additional funding resources 
for this purpose.
Comparative evidence is indeed revealing. As is evident from comparative 
practice,131 unemployment insurance contribution rates in a range of 
developing and developed countries are almost without exception higher, 
and in some cases significantly higher, than is the case with the UIF.132 
In addition, these higher contribution rates would usually only pay for the 
contingency of unemployment due to termination of employment, while other 
unemployment-related benefits, such as sickness, maternity and adoption 
benefits, are covered by other, non-unemployment insurance schemes.133
It is, therefore, recommended that, in view of compelling comparative 
evidence and the need to enlarge the funding base of the UIF in order to 
introduce and implement a range of crucial reforms, raising the (combined) 
contribution rate be seriously considered.
7 4  Developing a streamlined adjudication framework134
Different kinds of disputes, with varying dispute resolution routes, are 
applicable to the South African unemployment insurance system. The relevant 
128 In the South African UIF context, introducing any of these measures would be in addition to the statutorily 
introduced higher income replacement rate applicable to low-income earners, on the basis of which a 
graduated scale of benefits applies – see part 3 2 above, in particular Sch 2, read with s 12(3)(b), of the 
UIA
129 See part 7 1 above
130 See part 2 above  In particular, it should be noted that by 2009 this surplus had grown to R23 5 billion 
(UIF Annual Report of the Unemployment Insurance Fund for the Year Ended 31 March 2010 (2010) 91)
131 See Olivier et al Redesigning the South African Unemployment Insurance Fund 206-212
132 Currently employers and employees contribute 1% each of the employee’s remuneration on a monthly 
basis to the UIF: a total contribution rate of 2%  See s 6 of the Unemployment Insurance Contributions 
Act
133 See the discussion in part 6 above
134 See also Olivier & Van Kerken “Unemployment Insurance” in Social Security 456-457
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laws, namely the UIA and the Unemployment Insurance Contribution Act 4 of 
2002 (“UICA”), provide for different adjudication possibilities, depending on 
whether the dispute concerns the payment or non-payment of contributions,135 
a criminal offence,136 a compliance order,137 the statement of a case to a 
court,138 and the payment or non-payment of benefits.139 For purposes of this 
contribution, the emphasis is on the latter category of disputes, namely the 
payment or non-payment of benefits.
In the current unemployment insurance system, aggrieved persons 
who claim to be entitled to benefits in terms of the UIA may appeal to the 
Regional Appeals Committee, and from there refer the matter to the National 
Appeals Committee of the Unemployment Insurance Board for decision, if 
the Unemployment Insurance Commissioner suspends such persons’ rights 
to benefits or a claims officer makes a decision on the payment or non-
payment of their benefits.140 A decision by the National Appeal Committee 
is final, subject to judicial review.141 In all other cases the Labour Court has 
jurisdiction to deal with matters in terms of the UIA,142 except in the case of 
offences committed in terms of that Act.143
135 Dispute resolution in respect of UIF contributions is dealt with by the provisions of the UICA  The Act 
stipulates that the relevant Commissioner may request a labour inspector to assist in the investigation 
of any employer who is required to make contributions (s 15)  Objections and appeals can be lodged in 
accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (s 14(1)(c) & 14(2)(d))  The provisions of 
that Act with regard to the jurisdiction of the courts also apply in respect of contribution disputes arising 
from the UICA (s 14(1)(h) & 14(2)(j))
136 The normal criminal court system would be applicable to offences, as s 66 of the UIA makes it clear that 
the Labour Court does not have jurisdiction in respect of an offence in terms of the Act  It would appear 
that the same applies to offences committed under the UICA, as s 17 of that Act does not provide for a 
specialised dispute resolution framework in respect of such disputes
137 A labour inspector may issue a compliance order to a non-compliant employer (s 39 of the UIA)  An 
employer may object to a compliance order by referring the dispute for resolution to the Director-General 
of the Department of Labour (s 40)  The Act grants the Director-General the specific power to apply to 
the Labour Court for a compliance order to be made an order of the Labour Court if the employer has not 
complied with the order: s 41  
138 According to s 67(1) of the UIA, if any question of law arises concerning the application of this Act, the 
Director-General may of his or her own initiative, or at the request of a party with sufficient interest in 
this matter, state a case for decision by the Labour Court  S 67(3) provides for a further appeal by the 
Director-General (against the decision by the Labour Court) to the Labour Appeal Court
139 See s 37 of the UIA, read with s 36A
140 Wide powers are granted to these committees: They may confirm or vary the decision in question, or 
rescind it and substitute the decision of the relevant committee, as the case may be: s 37(4)(b) of the 
UIA
141 S 37(3) of the UIA  It is not clear whether judicial review will be exercised by the High Court or the 
Labour Court – the Labour Court does not have general judicial review powers outside the framework of 
the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (“LRA”), in terms of the provisions of s 158 of the LRA
142 It is not clear whether the powers of the Labour Court in this regard should be understood to include 
the power to deal with matters on the basis of administrative law (ie judicial) review, or whether the 
High Court is still entrusted with judicial review jurisdiction in relation to UIF disputes which are 
amenable to judicial review  See also s 37(3) of the UIA and note 146 above  In Tseleng v The Chairman, 
Unemployment Insurance Board 1995 16 ILJ 830 (T) the Court was asked to review the policy of the 
Unemployment Insurance Board in terms whereof the granting of additional benefits (as provided for by 
s 35 of the UIA 30 of 1966) was made subject to the requirement that the applicant must satisfy the Board 
that he or she actively sought work while receiving initial unemployment benefits  Amongst other things, 
the Court found the policy to be unconstitutional, due to the fact that the policy had not been disclosed to 
the applicant  The failure to disclose the policy amounted to a breach of the applicant’s fundamental right 
to procedurally fair administrative action conferred by s 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act 200 of 1993 (“Interim Constitution”) (845E-G)  
143 S 66 of the UIA
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Two issues need to be raised. The first relates to the absence of an accessible 
dispute resolution institution, outside the framework of the UIF itself, also 
from the perspective of the broader South African social security adjudication 
system. The second relates to the suggested non-compliance of the current 
UIF adjudication system with international standards.
As regards the first matter namely the absence of an accessible dispute 
resolution institution outside the UIF framework, it should be noted that 
the Regional and National Appeals Committee structures set up by the UIA 
should be seen as part of the internal dispute resolution framework. This flows 
from the fact that members of these Committees, though appointed by the 
Minister of Labour,144 are drawn from the ranks (ie members) of the UIF 
Board.145 Whether the Labour Court could be seen as an easily accessible 
institution where flexible dispute resolution procedures would apply is of 
course debatable.
From the perspective of the broader social security system in South Africa, 
the present system is riddled with contradictions in terms of adjudicative 
measures, institutions and available remedies – as has been noted by the 
Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for 
South Africa (the Taylor Committee).146 Different bodies and officials are 
required to hear complaints in relation to appeals in respect of various parts of 
the system, undue delays occur far too often, courts only have review powers 
and no appeal powers, with the result that they are not specialised enough 
to deal with social security measures, litigation costs are prohibitive, cases 
are often dealt with on a purely legalistic, technical basis, with scant regard 
for considerations of fairness, and external adjudication measures at times 
involve the High Court and at times the Labour Court.147
The Taylor Committee consequently recommended that a uniform 
adjudication system be established to deal conclusively with all social security 
claims. This system should incorporate, firstly, an independent internal review 
or appeal institution and, secondly, a court (which could be a specialised court) 
(or, one could add, an independent tribunal) which has the power to finally 
adjudicate all social security matters. This court (or tribunal) should have the 
power to determine cases on the basis of law and fairness. The jurisdiction of 
this court (or tribunal) should cover all social security claims, whether under 
the UIA, the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996, COIDA and all the other 
benefits (including the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004) emanating from the 
social security system.
As regards the second matter, namely the suggested non-compliance of the 
current UIF adjudication system with international standards, reference should 
144 S 36A(1) of the UIA, which refers to the appointment of (members of) Regional Appeals Committees  
Presumably the same arrangement would apply to the appointment of (members of) National Appeals 
Committees, although the Act does not regulate this specifically  
145 According to s 50(2)(a)(i) of the UIA, the constitution of the UIF Board must provide for the establishment 
and functions of committees of the Board, which must include an appeals committee
146 Committee of Inquiry into a System of Comprehensive Social Security for South Africa Transforming the 
Present - Protecting the Future 124
147 124
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be made to the applicable provisions of the ILO Social Security (Minimum 
Standards) Convention (Convention 102 of 1952) and the ILO Employment 
Promotion and Protection against Unemployment Convention (Convention 
168 of 1988).148 According to Convention 102, every claimant shall have a 
right of appeal in case of refusal of the benefit or complaint as to its quality 
or quantity.149 Where a claim is settled by a special tribunal established to 
deal with social security questions and on which the persons protected are 
represented, no right of appeal shall be required.150 Convention 168 provides 
that a dispute concerning the refusal, withdrawal, suspension, or reduction 
of the quantum of benefits must be resolved by the body administering the 
scheme, and that there should thereafter be an appeal to an independent 
body.151 The available procedures should be simple and rapid.152 The essence 
of this article is not that an in-house body should deal conclusively with 
disputes, but that that there should be a dispute resolution mechanism which 
includes an independent appeal procedure. Furthermore, the appeal procedure 
should allow the claimant to be appropriately represented or assisted.153
It is suggested that the current UIF dispute resolution procedure in respect 
of the payment or non-payment of benefits falls short of the standards set by 
these two ILO instruments. For the reasons advanced above, the Regional and 
National Appeals Committees cannot be regarded as constituting an external, 
independent appeal mechanism. The absence of a statutorily required legally 
qualified person on these committees,154 and the fact that these committees 
take their decisions by majority vote,155 underscores the conclusion that these 
bodies cannot be seen as true (external) appeal institutions. Furthermore, 
subjecting the “final” decision of the National Appeals Committee to judicial 
review, also does not amount to an appeal to an external independent institution, 
as judicial review is a power to be exercised within narrow boundaries, and 
certainly does not include an appeal.156
Therefore, in view of the largely fragmented adjudication system existing 
in social security in South Africa, the establishment of a dedicated social 
security adjudication mechanism to deal with social security disputes is 
recommended. This mechanism could be a dedicated court, or a tribunal. 
Adopting this approach would also make South Africa compliant with the 
international standards discussed above. Furthermore, heed should be taken 
of the additional requirements set by the relevant international instruments, 
148 See, in general in this regard, ILO Social Security and the Rule of Law ILC 100/III/1B 14-109
149 Art 70(1) of Convention 102
150 Art 70(3)
151 Art 27(1) of Convention 168
152 Art 27(1)
153 By a qualified person of the claimant’s choice or by a delegate of a representative workers’ organisation 
or by a delegate of an organisation representative of protected persons: art 27(2)  See ILO Social Security 
and the Rule of Law 172
154 See s 36A(2) of the UIA – no provision is made for a legally qualified person to be a member of the 
committee(s)
155 See s 37(4)(a)
156 See Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO 1998 BCLR 1326 (LAC); also see Samancor Chrome Ltd (Tubatse 
Ferrochrome) v Metal and Engineering Industries Bargaining Council (JA 38/2009) [2010] ZALAC 25 
(26-11-2010) paras 14-19 <http://www saflii org/za/cases/ZALAC/2010/25 html> (accessed 06-06-2011)
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namely that the procedures adopted by such a body should be rapid and simple, 
and that the claimant should have the right to be appropriately represented or 
assisted.157
8  Conclusions
Together with the two previous contributions, this contribution highlights 
particular reform challenges facing the UIF, flowing from a range of 
shortcomings, deficiencies and inconsistencies. The need – and timing – for 
this is accentuated by the governmental resolve to establish a comprehensive 
social security system which is at various levels streamlined, integrated and 
coordinated.
It is evident that there is need to align various aspects of the unemployment 
insurance system in South Africa with relevant international standards, in 
particular those emanating from the ILO, but also from SADC. The reforms 
required from an international standards perspective include the upwards 
adjustment of the minimum income replacement rate and of the income 
replacement rate applicable to maternity benefits, reducing the benefits 
waiting period, removing the exclusion of migrant workers, taking steps 
to statutorily provide for, and enter into appropriate bilateral agreements 
(which could cover not only unemployment insurance, but also other social 
security arrangements), the coordination of private employment agencies and 
public employment services, covering workers who have become partially 
unemployed or whose services have been temporarily suspended, ensuring 
the continuation of (initial) benefits even if the unemployed worker refuses 
to take up a non-suitable job offer, and aligning the social security (including 
the unemployment insurance) adjudication framework with international 
standards. Complying with these standards will move South Africa closer to 
be in a position to ratify these instruments, in particular ILO Convention 102 
of 1952 on minimum standards in social security.
It is, furthermore, necessary to develop synergies with the rest of the 
social security system, and to bring about appropriate institutional reform 
and alignment. The South African social security system is characterised 
by a high degree of fragmentation and duplication at all levels – including 
the policy, legal, adjudicative, institutional, operational, funding and service 
delivery levels. From an overall perspective, a common vision and framework 
is lacking. This affects unemployment insurance as well, which has tended to 
operate in relative isolation from the rest of the social security system. Ample 
opportunity exists to introduce streamlined collection of contributions, the 
establishment of a common registry, shared benefit payment facilities and 
arrangements, integrated service delivery, a common regulator, and common 
monitoring and external dispute resolution institutions. Interfacing regarding 
policy-making and co-ordinated institutional frameworks, the harmonisation 
of benefits, skills training and early return to work policies should be 
considered, in addition to the re-alignment of the UIF benefit regime.
157 See, in general, ILO Social Security and the Rule of Law 172-175
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However, there are particular considerations and substantive constraints, 
which both define and circumscribe the extent and content of the alignment 
of the UIF that is currently considered. These considerations and constraints 
relate in particular to the compensation (ie income-replacement) function of 
the UIF; the role of the UIF as a labour market instrument; and the need 
to recognise unemployment insurance as a separate risk category with 
a ringfenced contribution (ie funding) and benefit regime framework. 
The particular purpose and role of the UIF require its separate treatment, 
irrespective of where institutionally the UIF will be located in the new social 
security constellation in South Africa. Good standards in financial governance 
persuasively indicate that there be in principle full separation of accounts – and 
reserves – with appropriate actuarially defined separate contribution rates for 
each different risk. In particular, separating short-term and long-term benefits 
is imperative. International experience also overwhelmingly indicates that 
unemployment insurance is, with little exception, being treated as a separate 
risk category.
In addition to the shortcomings in the present UIA discussed in the first two 
contributions, relating in particular to coverage exclusions and the absence of 
a sufficient legislative nexus between the compensation focus (passive labour 
market context) and the desired labour market integration framework (active 
labour market interventions) of the UIF, certain other material deficiencies 
and inconsistencies also appear from the UIA. Two issues are highlighted 
in this contribution: the restriction on certain contributors to benefit, and 
the inchoate notion of “dependant”. It is submitted that it is unconscionable 
to impose a statutory obligation to contribute to the UIF and yet refuse 
entitlement to benefits (from a bargaining or statutory unemployment fund 
or scheme) for the mere reason that there is an entitlement under a different 
(non-public) scheme. There are also several problems with section 30 of the 
UIA, providing for dependants’ benefits – with particular reference to the 
apparent ranking of children below surviving spouses and life partners. An 
appropriate definition of who is a dependant, and an appropriate framework 
for the distribution of benefits have to be developed.
It should also be considered to separate unemployment insurance benefits 
in the strict sense of the word (ie benefits accruing to a beneficiary as a 
result of loss of employment) from unemployment-related benefits such as 
sickness, maternity and adoption benefits. These (latter – unemployment-
related benefits) could be catered for under separate schemes designed for 
family benefits and sickness benefits, as currently they stretch the financial 
capacity of the UIF and divert the focus of the UIF from pressing issues 
such as re-integrating unemployed (ex) workers into the labour market and 
contributing to preventing and combating unemployment.
There is also need to introduce certain standardised arrangements, in 
addition to other particular reforms, to ensure a streamlined and effective 
unemployment insurance scheme in South Africa. This would enable the UIF 
to provide enhanced material coverage to beneficiaries – as regards both the 
quality and quantity of benefits. Four areas deserve particular attention in 
this regard. Firstly, benefits paid by the UIF need to be indexed, preferably to 
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the CPIX or the minimum wage in a particular sector (or a general minimum 
wage if this were to be introduced) and updated regularly to maintain their 
purchasing power. Secondly, serious consideration should be given to the 
introduction and implementation of a minimum wage, which could then serve 
as a tool to ensure a minimum unemployment insurance benefit; in addition, 
it could also serve other important purposes, including facilitating access to 
a range of other social benefits, and to be used as a tool to benchmark the 
indexation of benefit increases.
Thirdly, in view of compelling comparative evidence and the need to enlarge 
the funding base of the UIF in order to introduce and implement a range of 
crucial reforms, raising the (combined) contribution rate to the UIF should be 
seriously considered. Finally, in view of the largely fragmented adjudication 
system existing in social security in South Africa, the establishment of a 
dedicated social security adjudication mechanism to deal with social security 
disputes, including UIF benefit disputes is recommended. This mechanism 
could be a dedicated court, or a tribunal. Adopting this approach would also 
make South Africa compliant with the applicable international standards. As 
indicated by these standards, rapid and simple procedures are required, and 
the claimant should have the right to be appropriately represented or assisted.
SUMMARY
This contribution examines selected issues from a policy and legal perspective. Against 
the background of the broader social security reform agenda in South Africa and the vision of a 
comprehensive social security system, the contribution covers five key areas, namely alignment with 
international standards; the need to develop synergies with the rest of the social security system and 
for institutional reform and alignment; addressing certain material deficiencies and inconsistencies in 
the UIF legislation (with reference to removing the restriction on certain contributors to benefit and 
redefining the range of dependants); re-aligning the current UIF benefit regime to focus on loss of 
employment; and improving the UIF benefit regime through the introduction of standardised measures 
and other reforms (with reference to the indexation of benefits, utilising a minimum wage arrangement 
as a basis for benefit enhancement, adjusting the contribution rate and developing a streamlined 
adjudication framework). It is argued that complying with relevant international standards will move 
South Africa closer to be in a position to ratify these instruments, in particular ILO Convention 102 
of 1952 on minimum standards in social security. Ample opportunity exists to introduce streamlined 
approaches in among others the collection of contributions and shared benefit payment facilities and 
arrangements, and the harmonisation of benefits. However, particular considerations and substantive 
constraints define and circumscribe the extent and content of the alignment of the UIF that is currently 
considered. These relate in particular to the compensation function of the UIF; its role as a labour 
market instrument; and the need to recognise unemployment insurance as a separate risk category 
with a ringfenced contribution and benefit regime framework. It should also be considered to separate 
unemployment insurance benefits in the strict sense of the word (ie benefits accruing to a beneficiary 
as a result of loss of employment) from unemployment-related benefits such as sickness, maternity and 
adoption benefits.
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